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Abstract
There are always new proposals concerning the application of new genetic 
technology. Some of them concern the genetic enhancement of man. There are 
four groups of such proposals, labeled as: better children, better performance, 
ageless bodies, and happy souls. The Magisterium of the Roman Catholic 
Church, which distinguishes between therapeutic and non-therapeutic genet-
ic manipulation, does not reject non-therapeutic genetic manipulation (genetic 
enhancement is such manipulation), but it does prescribe some requirements 
for its moral acceptance. However, these requirements are general and not very 
useful for determining specific moral limits for genetic enhancement of man. 
There are neither ready standards nor criteria for establishing those limits. The 
role of philosophers (theologians) then, is to ascertain those limits. It is possi-
ble to do that on the basis of virtue ethics in its version elaborated by St. Thom-
as Aquinas. His description of human perfection is of great help in establishing 
the morally acceptable limits of the genetic enhancement of man. Aquinas’s 
intuitions are confirmed by the observations of contemporary psychology. 
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The title of this paper requires some explanation. The Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy‘s entry on “Virtue Ethics” refers almost exclusively 
to Aristotle, with minor additional mention of a  few contemporary 
philosophers who either support or criticize the position. It also refers 
to ancient Chinese philosophy and the so-called virtue theories of Da-
vid Hume and Immanuel Kant, and even to some works by Nietzsche.1 
Surprisingly enough, there is no mention of St. Thomas Aquinas, who 
is the author of the most mature concept of virtue ethics. Why is this 
issue so important for this paper?
The problem of moral acceptability of genetic enhancement is dif-
ficult and anybody who deals with it realizes immediately that there 
are no ready standards which help to resolve it; there are no generally 
recognized criteria to discern which kinds of enhancement may be al-
lowable and which cannot be. The ethics community needs to establish 
those criteria, and the more accurate the description of human moral 
conduct, the better. So, if we want to find some criteria to resolve the 
problem of genetic enhancement, particularly of necessary limits based 
on virtue ethics, the more mature the concept of those ethics, the bet-
ter. However, some participants in the debate may object to employ-
ing Medieval philosophy or theology, particularly that of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, in evaluating the moral problems linked to the development 
of biotechnology. Are such objections legitimate? 
The rules which concern the subject of philosophy are different from 
those which concern the subject of empirical sciences, and by no means 
require us to reject St. Thomas’ philosophy. Unlike the empirical sci-
ences, the subject of philosophy, of which ethics is a  sub-division, is 
always given in its totality and not in progressive parts. In the empirical 
sciences, the knowledge of newly discovered phenomena may disprove 
our theories on a particular matter. In philosophy this is not the case. 
Thus, the reference to St. Thomas and to Aristotle is certainly a legiti-
mate approach in philosophy, whereas it might be questionable if we 
used it in the realms of certain natural phenomena, which remain the 
subject of empirical sciences.
The same argument concerns the objection to St. Thomas Aquinas 
as a theologian, i.e. being a theologian he is disqualified as a participant 
in the philosophical debate. The realistic approach of St. Thomas refers 
mostly to commonly recognized properties which might be expressed 
1 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/. Last seen: 20.07.2011.
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both in theological and philosophical terms. Thus, we may and can 
verify philosophically his concepts and ideas, as well as certain philo-
sophical statements expressed both by Christian theologians and the 
Magisterium of the Church. This peculiar trait of theological teaching 
makes it comprehensible not only to those who share the Christian 
faith, but also to non-believers who say they prefer to rely exclusively 
on human reason. The strong objections to that teaching have always 
been the best proof of such understanding. 
However, in order to avoid both kinds of objections, i.e. that the 
presented solution to the problem of genetic enhancement is based 
on outdated scientific data, or that it is valid only to the members of 
the Roman Catholic Church, I cite contemporary philosophers such 
as Dietrich von Hildebrand, Joseph Pieper, and Yves Simon,2 whose 
works refer to St. Thomas’s observations concerning man and the hu-
man condition. This choice is also advantageous in the respect that all 
the aforementioned philosophers choose to follow Thomas’s ethical 
intuitions rather than those which are fundamental to deontology or 
consequentialism, even though they knew the latter as well.
Genetic enhancement –  
proposals and first objections to them
Current proposals for human enhancement may be divided into four 
main groups. They are described in the report Beyond Therapy from the 
President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington D.C. 2003).3 The first 
group is called better children and is focused on children whose parents 
desire to have them be generally more competent and achieve better 
scholastic results. So far, only drugs known as mood brighteners may 
be used, but genetic technology is foreseen for the future. The second 
group known as better performance principally involves athletes. There 
exist various drugs which stimulate the human body to be stronger 
and more resistant to fatigue, and promote better results in various 
2 Hildebrand D. von, Christian Ethics, New York 1953, Pieper J., Leisure. The 
Basis of Culture, South Bend 1998, Simon Y., The Definition of Moral Virtue, New 
York 1986.
3 The President’s Council on Bioethics, A Report: Beyond Therapy. Biotechno- 
logy and the Pursuit of Happiness, Washington D.C. 2003.
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sport competitions. Genetic technology is expected to replace those 
drugs, so that the human organism could produce these kinds of sub-
stances on its own. The third group is known as ageless bodies. These 
projects concentrate on the effort to prolong the individual human 
life. Finally, the forth group labeled as happy souls covers all proposals 
of enhancement which aim at making human life happier. At present 
this kind of human mood may be artificially gained with psychotropic 
drugs, but in the future these drugs could be replaced with genetic 
technology.
At present, a  principal objection to medical, and particularly ge-
netic enhancement, is the question of safety. While medical enhance-
ment is potentially dangerous to human health, genetic manipulation 
of the human genome is highly complicated and usually irreversible, 
which makes it even more dangerous. Proponents of genetic enhance-
ment will argue that almost any new kind of manipulation has its risks. 
Nevertheless, after longer periods of experimentation, and after careful 
verification of obtained data, even genetic enhancement might become 
relatively safe. Hence, what at present seems dangerous might not be 
such in the future. That is why the other objections to genetic enhance-
ment seem more serious. We may find them not only in bioethical pa-
pers but also in the statements of moral authorities, even if they do not 
speak directly about genetic enhancement. The speeches and addresses 
of John Paul II are a good example of such statements. In addressing 
the moral acceptability of non-therapeutic genetic manipulation (ge-
netic enhancement is non-therapeutic manipulation), he warns against 
possible abuses based on a lack of due respect for human dignity, par-
ticularly in regard to the beginning of human life. Modification of hu-
man genetic patrimony based on a materialist concept of man or racial 
motives may enforce the reductionistic view of man and/or result in 
new divisions in societies.4 However, since these objections are general 
and tell us very little about how far we could proceed with genetic en-
hancement, if at all, the reference to virtue ethics in its interpretation 
by St. Thomas Aquinas is much more helpful.
4 Giovanni Paolo II, Arbitraria e ingiusta la manipolazione genetica che riduce 
la vita dell ’uomo ad un oggetto. Il discorso all’Associazione Medica Mondiale (29 
X 1983), Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, VI, 2 (1983), p. 921–923; Idem, Scienza 
medica e diritto in difesa dell ’integrità della persona. All’Unione Giuristi Cattolici 
Italiani (5 XII 1987), Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, X, 3 (1987), p. 1295.
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Virtue ethics and genetic enhancement
To resolve the problem of acceptable limits of genetic enhance-
ment we need to explain the meaning of “enhancement”. What 
does “enhancement” mean? “Enhancement” might correlate to “im-
provement”, “strengthening” or “augmentation”.5 Thus, enhancement 
(medical or genetic) does not aspire to change the very essence of 
man, but rather to bring about his betterment: although some aspect 
of his humanity may function properly (for the man), it is perceived 
as being inadequate, and there is impetus to make it better if not per-
fect. Philosophical investigation of this problem prompts us to refer 
to certain fundamental rules which make up a part of philosophical 
reasoning.
The first question concerns man: Who is man and what makes him 
good or perfect, and how might a given proposal of genetic enhance-
ment interfere with that good or perfection? Does it help to achieve 
that good or perfection, or does it have the contrary effect of di-
minishing that good or perfection? St. Thomas underlines that what 
makes man different and superior to other living beings is rationality. 
Rationality is not only the ability to use reason. Rationality based on 
spiritual dimension of man allows two specifically human abilities: 
thinking and free will. Thinking means that man is able to recognize 
reality and free will means that he is able to make moral choices. 
However, for St. Thomas, rationality is something more than that. It 
means not only that man is able to recognize truth about himself and 
the world, but also that he actually makes moral choices according to 
that truth. What makes man better as a man is the improvement of 
his rationality, i.e. that he better and better recognizes truth (includ-
ing moral truth) and that his moral choices become more and more 
compatible with it. Thus, the improvement of man does not consist 
in his closure to the truth about himself but rather in the fullest pos-
sible recognition of that truth. Similarly, human improvement is not 
5 McGee G., Ethical Issues in Enhancement: An Introduction, “Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics” (2000), 9, p. 299–303; Juengst E.C., What Does 
Enhancement Mean?, in: Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implica-
tions, E. Parens (red.), Washington 1998, p. 29; Pellegrino E., Biotechnology, Human 
Enhancement and the Ends of Medicine, Manuscript obtained from the Author in 
Washington D.C. in January 2006.
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found in what limits man’s free choice and thus limits his rational 
self-governance but rather in what helps him to make more rational 
free choices. Free choice is not only that which comes easily or more 
easily than before, but it is foremost the choice compatible with the 
truth about man, truth recognized by human reason which also gov-
erns human free choices.
The recognition of truth, free self-governance which is based on 
that truth, and aspiration to perfection in both are what makes hu-
man virtue. According to virtue ethics the virtuous man is a perfect 
man. If we consider the proposal of genetic enhancement, it does not 
occur in vacuum. Thus, the most important question which arises 
is: What is the difference between human improvement as a result 
of acquiring virtue and that which would be a result of genetic en-
hancement? 
There are interesting observations made by psychology which are 
compatible with the philosophical (Thomist) description of human 
conduct. Psychology indicates a great difference between the patient 
and careful education of a child who suffers from ADHD versus simply 
stimulating him with drugs. We have here two sets of behaviors which 
seem similar but only externally. Careful and patient education of the 
child helps him to take rational control of his own conduct, while stim-
ulation with drugs enforces or weakens the internal impulses which 
function properly only when the drugs are at work. Drug stimulation 
may help the subject achieve rational self governing as needed, but can-
not replace it definitively.6 Hence, drug stimulation as therapeutic ma-
nipulation may be considered as morally acceptable. The same may not 
be said about enhancement which is in fact non-therapeutic manipula-
tion, i.e. that which interferes with properly functioning properties. In 
his Christian Ethics, Dietrich von Hildebrand writes about those urges 
which are effectively impulses prompting us to some action. Action as 
a result of an urge is not the same as a virtuous action even if in the first 
case the subject does something good. This is because in a virtuous ac-
tion rational governing assumes the recognition of values and submits 
to them – something which is rational, i.e. specifically human and may 
not be replaced by any, even the most subtle, form of external manipu-
lation or stimulation.7 
6 The President’s Council on Bioethics, A Report: Beyond Therapy…, p. 91.
7 Hildebrand D. von, Christian Ethics, p. 191–243.
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Psychology also reminds us that many people have problems with 
their behaviors because the harmony between their governing center 
and the impulses which influence their bodies is lost. It is well per-
ceived not only in the cases of drug or alcohol abuse. Inner harmony 
within man is crucial for his rational self-governance. That is why peo-
ple strive to regain it and why it is a therapeutic, i.e. morally acceptable 
medical intervention. In contrast, genetic enhancement is a proposal 
for manipulation while that harmony already exists and which may 
damage or destroy the harmony. This is why medical enhancement, and 
its genetic form in particular, is so dangerous for human qua human, i.e. 
the rational and free being. 
Is genetic enhancement in humans morally 
acceptable?
When one takes into consideration the objections to non-therapeutic 
genetic manipulation expressed by the Catholic Church, and others 
who object to uncontrolled genetic enhancement, along with the re-
quirements of human perfection, only very few of the proposals of such 
enhancement may be accepted. Any proposal of this kind should be 
carefully scrutinized for its potential consequences for the internal har-
mony within man which conditions (to a certain degree) human ability 
to acquire virtue(s). Genetic enhancement cannot be permissible if its 
results are detrimental to virtue. 
Out of four groups of proposals, namely better children, better perfor-
mance, ageless bodies, and happy souls only a few proposals which belong 
to the second and the third groups may be morally accepted. Some pro-
jects concerning better performance may be accepted providing they 
are safe and do not interfere with the rules of competition in sport or 
the requirements of justice. For example we may consider the genetic 
equivalent of the improvement of vision which helps in golf.8 Also cer-
tain fine tuning projects which aim at the prolongation of the individual 
human life may be accepted.
Virtue ethics in its classic form as elaborated by St. Thomas 
Aquinas may be very useful to resolve many of contemporary man’s 
moral problems, even those as sophisticated as genetic enhancement. 
8 The President’s Council on Bioethics, A Report: Beyond Therapy…, p. 110.
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The topicality of this ethical concept may be confirmed among 
others by psychological observations. The solutions it gives pur-
pose the protection of man and his truly human fulfillment. What 
is more, those solutions are not arbitrary decisions of ethicists but 
something well-grounded not only in commonly recognized values 
and the objective requirements of perfection of the human being, 
but also in our knowledge of natural processes described by the 
empirical sciences.
